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Abstract
Background: Prospect theory suggests that when faced with an uncertain outcome, people display loss aversion
by preferring to risk a greater loss rather than incurring certain, lesser cost. Providing probability information
improves decision making towards the economically optimal choice in these situations. Clinicians frequently make
decisions when the outcome is uncertain, and loss aversion may influence choices. This study explores the extent
to which prospect theory, loss aversion, and probability information in a non-clinical domain explains clinical
decision making under uncertainty.
Methods: Four hundred sixty two participants (n = 117 non-medical undergraduates, n = 113 medical students, n = 117
resident trainees, and n = 115 medical/surgical faculty) completed a three-part online task. First, participants completed an
iced-road salting task using temperature forecasts with or without explicit probability information. Second, participants
chose between less or more risk-averse (“defensive medicine”) decisions in standardized scenarios. Last, participants chose
between recommending therapy with certain outcomes or risking additional years gained or lost.
Results: In the road salting task, the mean expected value for decisions made by clinicians was better than for non-
clinicians(−$1,022 vs -$1,061; <0.001). Probability information improved decision making for all participants, but non-
clinicians improved more (mean improvement of $64 versus $33; p = 0.027). Mean defensive decisions decreased across
training level (medical students 2.1 ± 0.9, residents 1.6 ± 0.8, faculty1.6 ± 1.1; p-trend < 0.001) and prospect-theory-
concordant decisions increased (25.4%, 33.9%, and 40.7%;p-trend = 0.016). There was no relationship identified between
road salting choices with defensive medicine and prospect-theory-concordant decisions.
Conclusions: All participants made more economically-rational decisions when provided explicit probability information
in a non-clinical domain. However, choices in the non-clinical domain were not related to prospect-theory concordant
decision making and risk aversion tendencies in the clinical domain. Recognizing this discordance may be important
when applying prospect theory to interventions aimed at improving clinical care.
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Background
Clinicians routinely make decisions for and with their
patients that are complex, under time constraints, and
involve risks or uncertain outcomes [1, 2]. These deci-
sions are informed by medical literature, clinical decision
rules, predictive models, and, in practice, a number of
subjective “rules of thumb” or heuristics that may devi-
ate from what is considered economically “rational.”
Decision scientists, psychologists, and behavioral econo-
mists have identified many such “decisional short-cuts”
that impact judgment and decision making [3, 4], and
some have extended heuristic-based decision theories to
clinician decision making. While empiric evidence for
the application of these decision theories to medical de-
cision making is increasing [5–7], it remains to be deter-
mined to what extent heuristic-based decision theory,
developed and validated in non-medical realms, can be
validated in real-world, health-related decision making.
For instance, prospect theory holds that people have a
tendency to make risk-seeking decisions in cost/loss sit-
uations. For example, they would rather risk a greater
cost than incur a certain, lesser cost to protect them-
selves against the greater loss [8, 9]. This pattern of be-
havior, an important part of prospect theory, asserts that
individuals make decisions based on the gains or losses
associated with possible outcomes, and that losing some-
thing causes more mental distress than gaining some-
thing of the same value [10]. However, the tendency
toward taking such risks may differ from one person to
another [11], due to level of expertise with uncertainty
information [12–14], or may differ from one domain
(e.g. health or finance) to another [15–17]. Furthermore,
research suggests that people make better decisions
when provided with explicit numeric uncertainty infor-
mation [18, 19]. Numerical uncertainty is commonly
expressed as probability, and probability estimates are
increasingly used to quantify risk in both nonmedical
and medical domains [18, 19]. However, prospect theory
was developed in non-clinical domains with non-clinical
participants, and there are gaps in the empirical evi-
dence of the utility of these theories to explain clinical
decision making of doctors.
To explore the applications of prospect theory, this
study aims to build on growing medical decision making
research activities over the last several decades by de-
scribing some unique decision making in scenarios with
uncertainty by doctors. To assess prospect theory in
these scenarios, we compared clinicians’ decision making
with that of non-clinicians, in non-clinical and clinical
domains by assessing to what extent expertise and level
of training impact decisions with uncertainty and risk-
preference. Specifically, we hypothesized that doctors
(perhaps due to advanced education or higher numeracy
[18, 19]) are better able to take advantage of explicit
probability than are non-doctors, and make more
economically-rationale decisions. Our second hypothesis
was that the risk propensity of doctors (in other words,
prospect-theory concordance in their decisions) is stable
across medical and non-medical domains and that risk
aversion in non-medical tasks would reflect risk aversion
in medical tasks. Our third hypothesis was that better
use of probability information would be associated with
less risk-inclined decision making (increasing prospect-
theory concordance when probability information is pro-
vided). To test these hypotheses, subjects performed a
three-part, web-based study that tested 1) non-medical
decision making with and without explicit probability in-
formation; and described medical decision risk prefer-
ence using 2) defensive medicine scenarios and 3) gain/
loss scenarios.
Methods
This study was approved by the University of Washington
Institutional Review Board.
Study population
Undergraduate students enrolled in the introductory
Psychology course at the University of Washington and
all medical students, residents, and faculty physicians at
the University of Washington were eligible. Potential
participants were contacted via email and were provided
a personalized link to the three online tasks described
below. Participants were encouraged to complete the
three tasks in one computer session at the participants’
discretion/choice of location. All participants were reim-
bursed $5 for participating, and up to $10 based on per-
formance in the decision task described below. Results
of 11 participants who began the tasks but failed to
complete them were excluded from analysis. In all, 462
participants’ results were included for analysis (n = 117
undergraduates, n = 113 medical students, n = 117 resi-
dents, n = 115 faculty physicians).
After providing informed consent, participants re-
ported their demographic characteristics and completed
three sequential tasks, as described below: a simulated
road salt decision task, a defensive medicine task and a
medical risk preference task. While many participants
self-identified as subspecialists, for descriptive purposes
their specialties were categorized as Surgical (Surgery,
Orthopaedics, Neurosurgery, Urology, etc.), Medical
(including Emergency Medicine), Pediatric (including
Adolescent Medicine) or Other (including Anesthesia,
Radiology, Pathology). Undifferentiated medical students
were asked to report medical specialty of interest.
Road salt decision task
In this task, modified to be completed in an online for-
mat from Joslyn and LeClerc [20], participants assumed
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the role of president of a road maintenance company, in
contract with a U.S. town to treat its roads for a two-
month period in winter to prevent icing. Over the
course of 60 trials, participants decided whether, based
on weather forecasts for nighttime low temperatures,
treating the roads with salt brine was warranted. They
received a virtual monthly budget of $36,000 for each of
the two hypothetical months of the game. Applying salt
brine cost $1,000 per day. Not applying salt brine cost
nothing, but if a freezing temperature occurred, partici-
pants were penalized $6,000. Thus, the decision task
represented a situation in which one had to decide be-
tween paying to protect oneself against a potential loss
and taking the risk that freezing temperatures would not
occur that night. Prospect theory suggests that people
tend to be risk seeking in such situations [8, 9].
Participants were instructed to maximize profits by
minimizing salting expenses and avoiding penalties.
They were told that they would receive a cash reward at
the end of the experiment commensurate with their end-
ing balance ($1 for every $1000 above $12,000, the
amount that would remain if they choose to salt every
day). In each trial, representing one day, a forecast for
the next night appeared on the screen. Participants indi-
cated their decision to apply salt brine to the roadways
or not by clicking on one of two boxes marked “Salt” or
“Not salt.” Immediately afterward, the actual nighttime
low temperature and any balance adjustments appeared
on the screen. Participants were able to continue even if
their balance dropped below $0 by borrowing against
the next month’s installment. After a break screen ap-
peared at the end of the first month, participants clicked
“Next” to continue on to the next month’s trials, and the
budget was increased by $36,000.
Forecast format was randomized between groups. There
were two conditions: a control condition and a probability
condition. In both conditions, participants saw a forecast,
e.g.: “The expected nighttime low temperature for tomor-
row is 35 °F”. In the control condition, this was the only in-
formation in the forecast. In the probability condition,
participants were told the percent chance that temperatures
would be at or below freezing: “The expected nighttime
low temperature for tomorrow is 35 °F and there is a 22%
chance that the temperature will be equal to or less than
32 °F”(Additional file 1). At the end of the second month,
participants were informed of their ending balance and
amount of cash reward.
There were two main outcomes reported for this por-
tion of the study, intented to characterize the influence
of prospect theory on decision making: expected value
and percent salting decisions above and below threshold.
Overall quality of decisions was reflected in expected
value, calculated for each participant for each trial day
(60 total). Expected value was the penalty (−$6,000)
multiplied by the probability of freezing for each trial on
which participants decided not to salt. Participants who
decided to salt were assigned the cost of salting
(−$1,000). A mean expected value score for all trials was
calculated for each participant. The expected value
measure is a surrogate for overall quality of decisions
made in the salting task, but does not account for where
salting decision systematically deviated from the optimal
decision. To that end, we also report percent of deci-
sions to salt below and above the economically optimal
threshold of 17% probability of freezing ($1000 divided
by $6000). When the probability of freezing is below
17%, the optimal decision is not to salt as salting would
be expected to cost more than the probability of freezing
multiplied by the penalty of $6000. Salting below 17%
would therefore be considered a risk-averse decision.
When the probability of freezing is above 17%, the opti-
mal decision is to salt as salting would be expected to
cost less than the probability of freezing multiplied by
the penalty of $6000. Not salting above 17% probability
of freezing would be considered risk-seeking. Our hy-
pothesis was that medical participants completing these
scenarios would have a higher expected value of deci-
sions, and would improve more than non-medical
participants when provided probability information.
Defensive medicine
Subsequent to completion of the salting trials, participants
were asked to answer questions about a series of four med-
ical scenarios (Additional file 2), adapted with permission
from Klingman et al. [21] These questions, drawn from
clinical situations used in board certification examinations,
were developed to empirically characterize the extent to
which defensive medicine affects clinical practice [21]. In all
of the scenarios, participants were given the choice between
(A) ordering a defensive medical test or procedure and (B)
declining further management, an option medically accept-
able by the expert panels. These scenarios depict defensive
medicine practice as “doing something” where not pursuing
further care would be acceptable. Prospect theory would
suggest that selecting the “doing something” decision fol-
lows the principle of loss aversion (less risky than doing
nothing). Acknowledging that the practice of defensive
medicine varies considerably across clinical situations (in
other words, a clinician may be defensive in one situation
but not in another) [22], the main outcome reported for
each participant was total “defensive score,” a sum of defen-
sive decisions made across the four scenarios. Our hypoth-
esis was that medical participants completing these
scenarios would make fewer “defensive” decisions as their
level of training (a surrogate for experience) increased. We
hypothesized also that risk-averse (or defensive) decisions
in these scenarios would be associated with risk-averse
decisions in the other two tasks.
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Nightingale risk preference instrument
Following the defensive medicine scenarios, participants
read two scenarios developed by Nightingale (Additional
file 3) designed to ascertain willingness to gamble on be-
half of patients in the face of gain or loss [23–25]. In the
first scenario focusing on gains, selecting option A rep-
resented a preference for a moderate gain and no chance
of failure. Selecting option B represents a preference for
a chance for significant gain, but also a risk of complete
failure. The second scenario was similar, but evaluated
willingness to accept loss for the patient: option A mini-
mized loss whereas option B subjected the patient to a
smaller risk of great loss and a possible risk of no loss.
According to prospect theory [8, 9], people prefer a cer-
tain gain, but avoid a certain loss (in other words, they
should select answer A in the first case, and B in the sec-
ond). To the extent that this is true, this instrument has
been proposed to evaluate the degree to which a phys-
ician is considered risk seeking or risk averse. Those
who refuse to gamble in the face of loss are considered
risk averse [26].
Responses for participants were organized into four
categories: (1) chose the certain option in both cases
(risk averse as above), (2) chose the risky option in both
cases, (3) prospect theory concordant (gambled on loss
scenario only), and (4) prospect theory discordant (gam-
bled on gain scenario only). We hypothesized that as
level of medical training increased, participants would
make fewer risk-averse decisions.
Statistical analysis
Patient characteristics and outcomes were summarized
using frequency distributions for categorical variables,
and means and confidence intervals (95% CI) for
continuous variables. We stratified our description by
medical versus non-medical status, as well as levels of
self-identified medical training (medical student, resi-
dent, faculty). Categorical variables were compared using
the Pearson χ2 statistic. To avoid multiple comparisons,
continuous variables were compared using an Analysis
of Variance (ANOVA) with post hoc pairwise compari-
sons [20]. For the salting task, mean expected value is
reported stratified by medical versus non-medical partic-
ipants and presentation of explicit probability informa-
tion. In addition, mean salting decisions below and
above the 17% threshold probability for freezing are re-
ported, stratified by medical versus non-medical partici-
pants and by availability of explicit probability
information. Linear regression models were used to
evaluate the association of increasing age with outcomes
in the salting task after adjustment for level of medical
training and probability type.
For the defensive medicine task, mean defensive score
and standard deviation (SD) by participant level is re-
ported. For the nightingale risk preference instrument, fre-
quency distributions based on participant level are
reported. Trends are reported using linear regression
models for a particular decision using level of training as a
continuous variable. Adjustment was done for medical
specialty, modeled as a categorical variable. Comparisons
were also made across the three tasks using ANOVA
models as above. Specifically, we report the correlation
decisions in the iced roads task (expected value and
overall salting choices) with defensive medicine score as
well as with risk aversion and prospect-concordant
decision-making in the Nightingale instrument. All correl-
ation models controlled for education level of participants.
A p-value of less than 0.05 was considered statistically
significant. All analysis was performed using SPSS version
19 (Armonk, NY: IBM Corp.).
Results
The demographics of the 462 participants (age range
18–74, 47% male) are shown in Table 1. Each level rep-
resented approximately 25% of the participant popula-
tion. There were expected age and gender gradients
across levels of medical training.
Table 1 Demographics of Non-Medical and Medical study participants
Non-Medical Medical Students Residents Faculty Total
Variable N = 117 25% N = 113 24% N = 117 25% N = 115 25% N = 462 100%a
Median age [range], years 20 [18–27] 25 [21–36] 30 [25–36] 49 [30–74] 28 [18–74]
Male 50 43% 41 37% 56 48% 69 61% 216 47%
Medical Specialtyb
Medicine - - 63 56% 29 25% 40 35% 132 38%c
Surgery - - 25 22% 56 48% 37 32% 118 34%c
Pediatrics - - 15 13% 27 23% 26 23% 68 20%c
Other/undecided - - 10 9% 5 4% 12 10% 27 8%c
aTotal may not add up to 100% due to rounding
bAre listed in descending order of largest proportion of total study cohort
cOut of total of medical participants, n = 345
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Salting task
Overall, 48.9% of participants (226 of 462) received explicit
probability information in this task: nnon-medical =59 (50.4%);
nmedical students = 50 (44.2%); nresidents = 59 (50.4%); nfaculty =
58 (50.4%). The mean expected value for medical partici-
pants (−$1022; 95% CI: −$1029, −$1016) was better than
for non-medical participants (−$1061; 95% CI: −$1073,
−$1049; p < 0.001) (Fig. 1). This suggests that medical par-
ticipants made overall better decisions in this task than
non-medical participants. Mean expected value for partici-
pants receiving probability forecasts (−$1017; 95% CI:
−$1027, −$1008) was higher than for those in the control
condition (−$1066; 95% CI: −$1075, −$1056; p < 0.001).
Moreover, probability information helped non-medical par-
ticipants more than medical participants (mean improve-
ment of $64 versus $33; p = 0.027). Age differences across
the two groups did not contribute any additional explan-
ation for differences in quality of decisions (p = 0.15). The
improved expected value with explicit probability informa-
tion persisted across the three levels of medical training (p
< 0.001) (Fig. 2). However, this improvement did not differ
across levels (p = 0.72). Age differences across the three
groups did not contribute any additional explanation for
differences in quality of decisions (p = 0.80).
Medical participants salted less below the 17% threshold
(mean 12.0%; 95% CI: 10.4%, 13.6%; versus 16.4%; 95% CI:
13.6%, 19.2%) (Fig. 3), and more above (mean 63.9%, 95%
CI: 62.3%, 65.5% versus mean 58.4%, 95% CI: 55.6%, 61.2%)
than did non-medical participants (p < 0.001). As compared
to participants using control condition forecasts, partici-
pants receiving probability forecasts salted less below 17%
(mean 11.5%; 95% CI: 9.2%, 13.7%; versus mean 16.9%; 95%
CI: 14.6%, 19.2%) and more above (mean 63.0%; 95% CI:
60.7%, 65.3%; versus mean 59.3%; 95% CI:57.0%, 61.6%; p <
0.001). While receipt of explicit probability information ap-
peared to help medical participants by decreasing decisions
to salt below the threshold and non-medical participants by
increasing decisions to salting above the threshold, this
trend did not reach statistical significance (p = 0.87). Age of
participant did not have any additional effect on salting
below or above the threshold (p = 0.24 and p = 0.18,
respectively).
Defensive medicine
Mean total defensive medicine scores decreased across
training level of participants (p-trend <0.001) (Fig. 4).
Undergraduate participants had the highest mean defensive
score of 2.7 ± 0.9 (out of 4). Interestingly, the trend in
Fig. 1 Expected Value estimates of Non-medical and Medical
participants, stratified by presentation of explicit probability information.
*Medical participants include medical students, residents, and faculty
physicians. †Medical participants made better decisions than non-
medical participants (mean expected value -$1022 versus -$1,061; p<
0.001). ‡Participants receiving probability information made better
decisions than those presented with control control scenarios (mean
expected value -$1017 versus -$1066; p< 0.001), but probability§ helped
non-medical participants improve more than medical participants (mean
improvement of $64 versus $33; p= 0.027)
Fig. 2 Mean expected values of across training level of medical
participants, stratified by presentation of explicit probability information.
*Participants receiving probability information made better decisions
than those receiving control scenarios (p< 0.001), but this † difference
did not change with medical education level (p= 0.72)
Fig. 3 Overall salting decisions of Non-medical and Medical participants,
stratified by presentation of explicit probability information. *Medical
participants salted less below 17% and more above, p< 0.001.
Participants receiving probability salt less below 17% and more above,
p< 0.001. Despite the appearance that probability information may have
helped non-medical and medical participants differently, there was no
evidence of interaction between medical status and probability
information condition (p= 0.87)
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decreasing defensive scores with levels of training persisted
in the subgroup of medical participants after adjustment for
medical specialty, with medical students having mean de-
fensive scores of 2.1 ± 0.9, residents having a mean of 1.6 ±
0.8 and faculty having a mean of 1.6 ± 1.1 (p-trend < 0.001).
Nightingale risk assessment
Responses to the Nightingale risk assessment instrument
were categorized as those who never took a gamble, those
who always took a gamble, those who took a gamble to
avoid a loss (prospect theory concordant) and those who
took a risk in the face of a gain only (inconsistent with pro-
spect theory) (Table 2). Of all groups of participants, under-
graduates had the highest proportion that always chose to
gamble 30.8%. The majority of medical participants (n =
345) either never took a gamble (n = 136, 39%) or only took
a gamble to avoid a loss (n = 118, 34%). Among medical
participants, the proportion who never chose to gamble (in
other words, who were risk-averse) decreased with increas-
ing medical education (48.7% of medical students, 39.3% of
residents, and 30.4% of faculty p-trend = 0.005). In addition,
the proportion of medical participants who made prospect
theory-concordant decisions (in other words, chose to only
gamble to avoid a loss) increased with medical education
level (26.5% of medical students, 34.2% of residents, and
41.7% of faculty, p-trend = 0.016). There was no evidence of
effect of medical specialty across Nightingale gamble choice
category (all p > 0.1).
Risk aversion across tasks
Beyond differences in decision making between medical
and non-medical participants and their use of probability
information, we found no relationship between decision
making in the salting scenarios and medical scenarios.
There was no evidence of correlation of defensive score to
expected value (p = 0.07) or to salting decisions (p = 0.97).
In addition, there was no correlation between risk-
aversion in the Nightingale instrument (never gambling)
and expected value (p = 0.16) or salting decisions (p =
0.14). There was no correlation between prospect theory
concordant decisions (gambling to avoid a loss only) and
expected value (p = 0.26) and salting decisions (p = 0.94).
Discussion
We found that in a non-medical domain, both clinicians
and non-clinicians made more economically rational de-
cisions when given explicit probability information. Cli-
nicians showed less improvement with probabilities than
did non-clinicians. However, baseline performance was
better for clinicians, which might suggest a ceiling effect
to improvement. Additionally, probability information
may have helped clinicians differently, by allowing them
to salt less below the economically optimal threshold
(suggesting fewer risk-averse decisions). For undergradu-
ates, presentation of probability information increased
salting above the threshold. No differences in decision
making in the non-medical task were noted across levels
of medical training for clinicians. Choices in the non-
medical domain were not related to prospect-theory-
concordant decision making and risk aversion tenden-
cies in the medical domains that were tested.
This study explored whether clinician decision making is
different than decision making by non-clinicians. Because
non-clinicians don’t have experience with making medical
decisions, we chose a task in which everyone has equal
Fig. 4 Mean defensive medicine score by training level of
participants. *Increasing medical education level results in less
defensive medicine (p-trend <0.001)
Table 2 Nightingale risk category by participant level (all participants, n = 462)
Never gamble Always gamble Prospect theory concordant Prospect theory discordant
N = 171 37.0%* N = 80 17.3%* N = 149 32.3%* N = 62 13.4%*
Non-medicala 35 29.9% 36 30.8% 31 26.5% 15 12.8%
Medical Studentsb 55 48.7% 14 12.4% 30 26.6% 14 12.4%
Residentsc 46 39.3% 14 12.0% 40 34.2% 17 14.5%
Facultyd 35 30.4% 16 13.9% 48 41.7% 16 13.9%
* Reported as percentage of all participants (n = 462)
aReported as percentage of all non-medical participants (n = 117)
bReported as percentage of all medical students (n = 113)
cReported as percentage of all residents (n = 117)
dReported as percentage of all faculty (n = 115)
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content expertise (weather and road-salting task) [20], al-
though clinicians might be expected to make better use of
probability information in this task because of advanced
education and/or numeracy [18, 19]. Our findings indicate
that in this task, clinicians did make better quality decisions
overall. There are several possible explanations for this. It
may be due to additional training in making decisions in sit-
uations with uncertainty or perhaps due to self-selection
into the medical field. However, this difference was not age-
dependent. These findings support the assertion that pro-
viding explicit probability information improves decisions
[18, 19]. However, it would appear clinicians have a differ-
ent baseline and explicit probability information may help
‘novices’ more.
We found that both defensiveness and risk aversion de-
creased with increasing medical experience. We measured
risk aversion three different ways in this study. In the first,
non-medical task, risk-averse errors would involve choosing
to salt when the probability of freezing was below the
economically optimal threshold of 17% (Fig. 3). To that
end, it would appear qualitatively that explicit probability
information reduced risk aversion more in clinicians. How-
ever, when compared to non-clinical undergraduates this
reduction did not reach significance, perhaps because risk
averse-errors were rare, overall. In the defensive medicine
scenarios, risk aversion manifested as a higher total of “de-
fensive decisions.” In the Nightingale instrument, risk aver-
sion was defined by lack of gambling for either years gained
or years lost. In the latter two tasks we saw that risk aver-
sion decreased with increasing medical experience. How-
ever, the lack of correlation between these medical
measures of risk aversion and risk aversion in the salting
task challenges the notion that risk aversion crosses do-
mains. Indeed, research dating back to the 1960s argued fi-
nancial risk taking might not be a good predictor of other
risk taking areas [27]. To that end, the disconnect between
domains found in our study supports the assertion that
medical decision making is different for clinicians, and
these findings raise awareness of studying risk preference in
a domain-specific way [15–17].
One possible explanation for the differences in decision
patterns and risk preference across domains may come
from the affect involved in healthcare-related decisions
[28]. Several behavioral studies have identified differences
in decision making between affect-rich and affect-poor
tasks [29–33]. This distinction is important because
multiple models of decision making under risk share the
common notion that outcomes are weighted by their prob-
ability, maximizing the expected outcome. However, when
faced with emotion or affect-charged decisions, evidence
suggests that people systematically choose the optimal
option less often [28]. And others have suggested that the
impact of probability information may be attenuated in
affect-rich choices [34]. Though this was not explicitly
studied in this set of tasks, the affect involved in choices
made by physicians in health-care decisions may be differ-
ent than that of non-clinicians, and may impact the mea-
sured risk preferences in these situations.
Another distinction between clinical and non-clinical de-
cisions involves the “agent effect,” in which making deci-
sions for others may invoke different levels of loss aversion
[35, 36]. While most decision making theory has focused
on situations where subjects choose for themselves, health-
care poses a unique environment where clinicians are often
delegated to make choices for others. In financial domains,
it has been shown that loss of others’ money would not
trigger an equal amount of emotional distress as loss of
one’s own money [37, 38]. Furthermore, it is unclear how
risk preferences change when shifting from self to others,
with evidence existing to support a change to more risk-
averse [39], no difference [40], or more risk-seeking deci-
sions [41–43]. With this in mind, the disconnect between
risk aversion in the first, non-medical task, and the second
and third, medical-domain tasks may come from a shift in
decision making for self (salting) versus others (patients in
medical scenarios). In that regard, the findings in this study
highlight a potentially significant challenge to the transla-
tion of classic decision theories or behavioral economics to
decision architecture aimed at improving clinician decision
making.
These findings should be considered in light of several
limitations. First, this is the first application of these tasks
using an online questionnaire. For feasibility reasons, it was
not possible to administer this task in a standard laboratory
across this spectrum of medical personnel. Furthermore,
our study is subject to selection bias towards those partici-
pants who chose to participate through email recruitment.
While it is reassuring the findings of the salting task were
similar to the findings of prior evaluations of the same task
in the laboratory setting, there may be more variation in
subjects’ attention, time, and investment in completing the
task in an online format. Since this is the first online appli-
cation of both the defensive scenarios [21] and the Nightin-
gale instrument [23–25], it is unclear how these responses
may differ. Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that sub-
jects’ decision-making in the controlled, laboratory setting,
may be different in the ‘real world’ where the real impact of
penalties incurred by their decisions is more tangible [44].
Second, our study may have been underpowered to detect
important differences in task responses. Group size was de-
termined using estimates (previously established by Joslyn
and LeClerc [20]) of the sample size needed to detect a dif-
ference in decision quality between control and probability
scenarios. To that end, we may have been underpowered to
detect differences between risk aversion and risk seeking
behavior and differences across domains or certain demo-
graphic variables like age, gender, and medical specialty.
For instance, age is typically associated with reduce risk
Simianu et al. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making  (2016) 16:153 Page 7 of 9
taking. This was not borne out in our results, but may be
because categories of medical training already explained
much of this variation, and our study was not powered to
detect differences in age, gender, or medical specialty.
Moreover, the tasks differ in important ways. For example,
the “road salt” task involves repeated decisions with feed-
back. There is some research to suggest that behavior in
these types of decisions deviates drastically from those
made in descriptive contexts like in the defensive medicine
scenarios [45, 46]. In addition, our defensive medicine sce-
narios don’t suggest the costs of the defensive choice, which
faculty may know and medical students may not. Thus, the
differences may not reflect differences in loss aversion or
risk attitude, but in knowledge. Finally, we categorized ex-
pertise two ways – clinician and non-clinician, and across
levels of medical education (student, resident, faculty). In
reality, expertise (in both numeracy and medical know-
ledge) happens across a continuum and is not strictly based
on the categorization of one’s position.
Conclusions
These limitations non withstanding, this study adds valu-
able insight into risk preferences across clinical and non-
clinical simulations in doctors, and more specifically across
levels of medical training. Medical training is expected to
change one’s experience with making decisions under un-
certainty and accordingly, we found trends in risk aversion
and prospect theory concordance across education levels.
In addition, the findings of this study demonstrate that cli-
nicians performed as predicted in a non-clinical decision
making experiment, with small differences perhaps ex-
plained by advanced numeracy. However, a lack or associ-
ation between decision patterns made across clinical and
non-clinical scenarios—that fact the so-called financial de-
cisions do not predict medical ones—challenges the appli-
cation of classic decision theories to those made by
clinicians, either because of the affective aspect of clinical
decisions or because of their role as agents. Understanding
which aspects of decision science translate into the clinical
realm and how clinicians may or may not behave differently
than non-clinicians is important because it may support the
crafting of interventions to improve clinicians’ decisions in
situations of uncertainty.
Additional files
Additional file 1: Sample salting questions as portrayed on the screen
of the individual participants: control (1A) and probabilistic (1B) versions.
Red arrow depicts addition of explicit probability information for
probability scenarios (1B). Actual temperature was displayed each day,
after decision to salt or not had been made (1C). (ZIP 71 kb)
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